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ABSTRACT 
 
Research suggests that the rightist discourse on immigration appeals to left-leaning 
citizens with lower levels of education. The opposite is, however, not true for right-
wing voters with lower educational levels, and this asymmetry leaves left-wing 
parties at a disadvantage compared with the right on immigration and integration 
issues (Sniderman et al., 2000). Deliberative theory promises that discussion, 
information, and reflection can promote a more balanced political discussion and a 
more enlightened citizen. In this paper, we assess the extent to which deliberative 
polling increases the ideological awareness of citizens with lower educational levels. 
More specifically, we gauge the extent to which especially less well educated left-
wing voters – those whose attitudes Sniderman et al. find to be particularly out of 
tune with their ideological predispositions regarding immigration and integration – 
adjust their attitudes as a consequence of deliberate exposure to informational 
input and the presentation of two-sided arguments. We make use of unique data 
generated during the first European-wide deliberative polling project, `EuroPolis', 
held in 2009. Our results indicate that less well educated left-wing voters indeed 
have slightly more negative attitudes towards immigrants than leftist voters with 
secondary or post-secondary educational levels. Turning to the micro-mechanisms 
of attitude change in a deliberative setting, our analyses show that both levels of 
education and ideological predispositions play a role in the extent to which 
participants of the deliberative poll adjust their attitudes. In three out of four 
models we find evidence that less well educated left-leaning citizens are indeed 
most likely to adjust their attitudes on immigration and integration after being 
presented with a more balanced discussion of the topic. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
In their book published a little over a decade ago Sniderman et al. (2000, 113) argue 
that attitudes towards immigrants and immigration are asymmetric in terms of 
ideology and political sophistication. Whereas the expectation is that left-wing 
voters have more favorable attitudes towards immigrants, Sniderman et al. in fact 
find that both less sophisticated left-wing voters and less sophisticated right-wing 
voters tend to have quite negative views about immigrants. This asymmetry gives 
right-wing parties an advantage over the left as not only right-wing voters, but also 
some on the left are more easily convinced of the negative effects of immigration on 
Western societies. 
 
In recent years, as part of the deliberative turn in political theory, empirical research 
has started to explore the changes in political attitudes and behaviour when 
information is offered under optimal institutional conditions (see e.g. Chambers, 
2003). Several instruments have been suggested to explore the extent to which 
robust democratic institutions, political participation, and political attitudes can 
interact in improved institutional arrangements, including deliberative polls, citizen 
juries, and town meetings. The recurring aim is to combine institutional conditions 
receptive to democratic discourse and expressive instances (not mediated by 
political or functional representation of the public) with the perceived influence that 
a calm, rational, and in-depth discussion may have on the formation of political 
preferences. 
 
Combining the findings of Sniderman et al. (2000) on attitudes towards immigration 
with the promise of deliberative theory that discussion, information, and reflection 
can promote a more balanced political discussion and a more enlightened citizenry, 
this paper aims to assess the extent to which deliberative polling helps less well 
educated citizens to become more aware of the policy attitudes that go hand in 
hand with their self-expressed ideological position.2 The micro-mechanisms of 
attitude change are a relatively understudied topic in the deliberative literature. It is 
not yet entirely clear who changes their attitudes as a result of deliberation and 
what the mechanism of this is. More generally, we do not even know whether 
deliberation implies an attitude change model that is different from those discussed 
in the framework of opinion change in other, less informative, environments. Our 
expectation is that the presentation of arguments in favor of and against 
immigration and an in-depth discussion of the topic will be to the particular 
advantage of those who are less skilled in connecting their policy positions to the 
ideology they claim to believe. In other words, deliberation may be a tool to 
increase awareness among the less well educated of the policy positions of both the 
left and the right on the immigration issue. 
 
In this paper, we focus our discussion on an issue where left-wing participants’ 
ideological positions sometimes clash with their own policy preferences. Our 
argument, however, is not limited to left-wing proponents and it is not intended to 
revive the argument known as the authoritarianism of the left. Our argument is 
more general, addressing the relative role of ideology and information in attitude 
 change.  
 
Our theoretical starting point is the classical distinction in cognitive psychology 
between heuristic and systematic information processing in dual-process models of 
persuasion. The heuristics (or peripheral) route stresses the influence of cues 
external to the arguments of discussion, while the systematic (or central) one points 
to the arguments contained in it. Which of these two processes will be used 
depends on motivational and ability factors, such as interest, education, and level of 
involvement. Assuming that motivation was high throughout the experiment – an 
assumption corroborated by different self-assessed measures of interest and 
involvement – we look at the role played by various levels of ability (assessed 
through educational attainment) in attitude change. More specifically, we focus on 
less well educated participants, and assess two competing hypotheses about the 
relative role of cues and ideology in attitude change. 
 
The first hypothesis follows the line of thought that attitude change is a matter of 
following cues (Zaller, 1992). Since the discourse on immigration in the media is 
negatively skewed (Vliegenthart and Roggeband, 2007), balanced discussion should 
lead attitudes to change in a more positive direction. Therefore, we expect that 
according to the heuristics route less well educated citizens – whether they place 
themselves on the left or the right of the ideological spectrum – should be more 
likely to benefit from the barrage of information to which they are subjected while 
partaking in the deliberative poll and change their attitudes in the same (positive) 
direction. 
 
Our second hypothesis is linked to the idea that people do not merely follow cues 
but also actively process information and connect it with their ideological 
predispositions. Following this line of thought, we ask ourselves whether those 
whose stances Sniderman et al. find to be particularly out of tune with their self-
expressed ideological beliefs are especially likely to adjust their attitudes to 
immigration. If this is indeed the case, left-wing less well educated citizens should 
disproportionally adjust their attitudes regarding immigrants and immigration in a 
more positive direction after deliberation, a sign that systematic, rather than 
heuristic, processing was at work. 
 
We assess these implications using data from the first European-wide deliberative 
poll held one week before the European Elections in 2009: the ‘EuroPolis’ project.  
Due to its quasi-experimental design, the data gathered during the research project 
allow us to compare the attitudes and behavior of respondents who did and those 
who did not participate in the deliberative poll. This makes the EuroPolis data 
extremely suitable for the research question at hand. Our results indicate that 
deliberation does seem to have a differential impact on people, depending on their 
level of education, and that this impact furthermore depends on the ideological 
stance of the respondent. In three out of four models, we found that those who are 
less politically astute and lean to the left are those more likely to change their 
attitudes regarding immigrants and immigration in a more positive direction. In 
terms of statistical significance, the link between ideology, education, and attitude 
 change is slightly stronger where the cultural threat of immigration is concerned 
than where the economic consequences of immigration and integration are 
concerned. Admittedly, education, ideology, and a handful of control variables only 
explain a small part of the variance in attitude change, which implies that our quest 
to understand the micro-mechanisms of attitude change in deliberative 
environments is still on-going. 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
The vulnerability of the left on the immigration issue as described by Sniderman et 
al. (2000) is rooted in various factors. While more politically aware and better 
educated citizens demonstrate high levels of correlation between ideological self-
placement and attitudes towards socio-political issues, the same is not true for 
those who are less well educated. Citizens with lower levels of political 
sophistication make more errors in translating core values into issue attitudes 
(Jacoby, 2006). Regarding the immigration issue, this distortion or 
’misunderstanding’ of their values is, however, of a different magnitude for those 
placing themselves on the left side of the ideological spectrum from that of those 
placing themselves on the right. 
 
Values such as order, tradition, and national integrity, formally rooted in the 
political right, appeal not only to right-leaning citizens but also to a high proportion 
of citizens placing themselves on the left (Sniderman et al., 2000, 116-120). Among 
those with higher levels of education there is a considerable distance between those 
who claim to belong to the left or right in terms of agreement with values of order 
and authority. However, while highly educated left-leaning citizens – as expected – 
are least likely to adhere to the values described above; less well educated left-
leaners are even more likely to adhere to values of order, tradition, and national 
integrity than highly educated citizens identifying with the right. The fundamental 
division over these values is thus not between the left and right, but within the left 
itself, as a significant proportion of left-leaning citizens adheres to the ideological 
commitments of the right. Sniderman et al. (2000) argue that there is a clear link 
between immigration and values of authority, as the issue is often framed in terms 
of order, tradition, and national integrity. Indeed, Vliegenthart and Roggeband 
(2007, 307-308) showed in a content analysis of Dutch parliamentary documents 
and media outlets that from the end of the 1990s immigration had increasingly been 
framed in terms of restrictions and threats (see also Morley and Taylor, 2012 on 
Italy and the United Kingdom). Limited integration by minorities leads to discussions 
of existing policies and measures. At the same time, new legislation is increasingly 
aimed at preventing new influxes of immigration and compelling newcomers to 
integrate. These findings have to be understood in the light of evidence that there is 
a relationship between the tone of the political discourse and anti-immigrant 
attitudes (see e.g. Boomgaarden and Vliegenthart, 2009). 
 
The asymmetric nature of immigration issues for left and right – but remember the 
argument might be applied to right-wing leaners for other issues such as, for 
 example, free trade preference – offers a unique opportunity to study the role of 
ideology and information in attitude change. It was Converse (1964) who sealed the 
first round of debate on attitude formation, defining the opinions of the American 
population towards many public issues at best as “non-attitudes". Converse showed 
that the general public lacked the capacity to fulfil the requirements of political life 
in a functioning democracy. Since then, it has been taken for granted that citizens 
are actually far from the ideal assumed by democratic theorists in terms of 
knowledge, interest, and motivation to participate in political democratic life. This 
conclusion, over the years, has been challenged from different angles and with 
different lines of argument (Althaus, 2003; Erikson et al., 2002; Popkin, 1991; 
Sniderman et al., 1991; ). 
 
In recent years, as part of the deliberative turn in political theory (see e.g. 
Chambers, 2003), empirical research has started to look beyond these limits and has 
explored more closely the potential of public opinion when optimal institutional 
conditions are offered for carrying out the cognitive tasks citizens are expected to 
perform. The goal of most of these experiments is to ascertain whether and how 
individual preferences would change if the information and interest gap that 
characterizes the public discussion in modern societies were to be filled in. 
Deliberation is seen as a counter-factual experiment to provide a glimpse of a 
hypothetical public, one much more engaged with and better informed about 
politics than citizens in their natural surroundings actually are (Luskin et al., 2002, 
458). The results of more than two decades of research are encouraging (see e.g. 
Delli Carpini et al., 2004; Ryfe, 2005, and Thompson, 2008). Indeed, an increase in 
the quantity and quality of information, combined with an environment conducive 
to equal and balanced discussion, produces significant changes in the policy 
preferences of participants (Fishkin and Luskin, 1999). However, the micro-
mechanisms of attitude change are still a relatively understudied topic in 
deliberative theory. We do not really know who changes their attitudes as a result 
of deliberation and the mechanism by which this happens. More generally, we do 
not even know whether deliberation implies an attitude change model that is 
different from those discussed with regard to opinion change in other, less 
informative, environments.3 
 
To address this gap, a good starting point is the theoretical debate on attitude 
change in social psychology that traditionally focuses on dual-processing 
perspectives (e.g. Bohner et al. 2008; Bohner and Dickel 2011; Petty and Cacioppo 
1981; Petty and Wegener 1998;). This debate has resonated in the political science 
literature as well. It was initiated by Zaller (1981), who stressed the nature and 
direction of the informational environment as the main source of attitude change, 
especially among those less politically aware. His theoretical approach was 
subsequently criticized by those, like Sniderman et al. (1991), who stressed the 
autonomous role of internal predispositions, of which political ideology was among 
the first to be included, in shaping the way information is processed for both the 
less well and the better educated. Our analysis can be cast as a contribution to this 
wider theoretical debate about the relative weight of heuristics and systematic 
thinking on persuasion in social psychology (Bohner et al., 2008; Bohner and Dickel, 
 2011; Petty and Cacioppo, 1981) and political science (see e.g. Sniderman et al. 1991 
and Zaller 1981). We assess two competing hypotheses that can be placed in the 
discussion on the role of ideology in attitude change. Both hypotheses revolve 
around what happens to less well educated citizens once they are embedded in a 
deliberative context, but they diverge regarding the kind of information processing 
these people are expected to use in such a context. Of course, we have no way of 
measuring the actual mental process participants in the deliberative poll use, but we 
can infer what should happen in such a context from the different implications of 
the two theoretical routes. 
 
The first hypothesis follows the assumption that attitude change is a peripheral 
process based on responses to cues. Less well educated citizens face a wider 
information gap and they are, therefore, more dependent on heuristics than better 
educated citizens. It is, therefore, the group of less well educated citizens that is 
considered to change their opinions most as they use the informational cues and 
heuristics of the deliberative polling process to reconsider their attitudes. In a 
deliberative poll, the cues on the immigration issue are expected to be more pro-
immigration oriented than heuristics on immigration presented in the general 
political discourse, if for no other reason than that deliberative polls make an 
explicit effort to ensure an informationally balanced environment. In so doing, a 
deliberative poll environment corrects the informationally asymmetric immigration 
discourse discussed above (e.g. Morley and Taylor, 2012; Vliegenthart and 
Roggeband, 2007). Our first hypothesis, therefore, posits that citizens with lower 
educational levels will be more likely to adapt their preferences in a more pro-
immigration direction regardless of their ideological predispositions. In other words, 
less well educated citizens participating in the deliberative poll should change their 
attitudes more than better educated citizens, but we should not find differences 
between less well educated participants placing themselves on the left and the 
right. 
 
Our second hypothesis hinges, however, on the assumption that in a deliberative 
context, citizens do not just follow informational cues, but that they also actively 
process the information and connect it to their ideological predisposition. We 
expect that those more likely to err in the translation of values into attitudes on the 
immigration issue – i.e. less well educated left-wing citizens – will benefit most from 
the presentation of arguments for and against immigration as well as an in-depth 
discussion of the topic. Since the attitudes of less well educated left-leaning voters 
are particularly out of tune with self-expressed ideological beliefs, we argue that 
deliberative polling should disproportionately lead to attitude change and more 
positive attitudes towards immigrants and immigration among this subset of 
participants. Following this second hypothesis, less well educated citizens are still 
considered to adjust their attitudes on immigration more than better educated 
participants. However, we expect to see differences between less well educated 
participants placing themselves on the left or the right of the political spectrum. 
Becoming more aware of the policy attitudes that go hand in hand with their self-
expressed ideological position, those placing themselves on the left will find the 
discrepancies between earlier held beliefs and the newly provided information 
 largest. As a result of this, this group is thought to change their attitudes most. 
 
 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
The deliberative polling project 
 
To explore the extent to which deliberative polling makes citizens more aware of 
their ideological stances, we use data gathered under the EuroPolis project, a three-
day Deliberative Poll (DP)4 experiment held in Brussels one week before the 
European Parliamentary election of June 2009.5  
 
There are five main characteristics of a deliberative opinion poll: random 
recruitment of participants, informational input about the issues discussed in 
balanced briefing materials, moderated small group discussions, plenary sessions in 
which questions from the small groups are answered, and repeated attitude 
measurement. As compared to standard deliberative polls, the EuroPolis-project 
added two further elements to strengthen the overall research design: first, a 
control group who did not attend the event but who were given a pre- and post-
questionnaire, and, second, a systematic recording of all verbal interactions in the 
small group discussions to obtain both individual-level and group-level measures of 
the quality of the discussion. 
 
The EuroPolis opinion poll event focused on two issues – immigration and climate 
change – selected with the aim of studying the role of deliberation in a highly 
controversial and emotional political issue. A random sample of approximately 350 
EU citizens was invited first to discuss the two selected topics in small groups and 
later in plenary sessions with policy experts and politicians. This group was 
proportionally stratified according to the number of seats allocated to each Member 
State in the EU Parliament. The participants were interviewed 1.) before, 2.) during, 
3.) directly after the DP, and 4.) once again a few days after the European 
Parliamentary elections. Their views are compared to those of a control group – a 
sample who were not invited to the deliberative weekend – who were questioned 
both at the stage of participant recruitment (i.e. before the poll) and again after the 
elections. Figure 1 summarizes the research design of the EuroPolis deliberative poll. 
 
<FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
 
Figure 1. A schematic representation of the research design of the deliberative poll 
 
The recruitment of participants took place in several stages. First, a cross-sectional 
random sample of the EU’s citizen population aged 18 or more was surveyed at the 
end of April/early May of 2009 (t1, n=4384). The purpose of this survey was to 
gauge people’s policy preferences and levels of knowledge about the two policy 
issues that would later structure the DP event. Interviewees were randomly 
assigned to the test or control group, with test group interviewees being invited to 
take part in the deliberative poll in Brussels at the end of the interview. Those 
 assigned to the test group who accepted the invitation to take part in the event 
subsequently received balanced background materials to inform them about the 
issues to be discussed and to invite them to pay more attention to as well as put 
more thought into the selected topics. Briefing materials were translated into a total 
of 21 languages. Experts and politicians who participated in the process of drafting 
the briefing materials were also invited to attend the DP so as to answer 
participants’ questions during plenary sessions.6 
 
Deliberative poll participants, experts, and politicians came together for three days 
in Brussels over the weekend of May 29-31, 2009. The participants (t2, n=348) filled 
out a questionnaire upon arrival (t2) and were then randomly assigned to small 
groups (25 groups in total) to discuss immigration and climate change under the 
guidance of a moderator. All verbal exchanges occurred in the participants’ mother 
tongue. At the end of the event, before leaving, the test group participants filled out 
another questionnaire (t3, n=348). Finally, the participants in the polling experiment 
were questioned again the week after the 2009 European Parliament elections of 4-
7 June (t4, n=333). To explore the impact of the DP event, a random sample of the 
EU population (i.e. control group, n=1005) was surveyed simultaneously with the 
test group at t4. While the first and last survey were conducted via CATI/CAPI, the 
second and third were self-administered questionnaires distributed to participants 
during the polling event. 
 
Two indexes of attitudes towards immigrants 
 
All our analyses are based on questions asked to both the test and control group in 
the first and last wave of the deliberative poll. We use two dependent variables to 
measure attitudes toward immigrants: a measure of the perceived cultural threat, 
and a measure of the perceived economic threat from immigration. 
 
A first measure of attitudes toward immigrants taps the perception of how culturally 
close immigrants have to be in order to be admitted to the respondents’ countries. 
The question asked, on a 0-10 scale, how important each of the following three 
criteria “should be in deciding what immigrants from non-EU countries should be 
admitted" to the country: “being able to speak the national language", 
“commitment to the national way of life", and the fact that the immigrant was 
“coming from a similar culture". A fourth item asked where the respondents would 
position themselves, always on a scale from 0 to 10, where “0 means that Muslim 
immigrants have a lot to offer to [COUNTRY]’s cultural life, 10 means that Muslim 
immigrants threaten the [NATIONALITY] culture and 5 is exactly in the middle" (see 
appendix A for the exact wording of questions). 
 
The second index is based on three questions related to economic issues relevant 
for immigration. The questions were all with the same format, scaled from 0 to 10, 
and asked about how important “each of the following criteria should be in deciding 
which immigrants from non-EU countries should be admitted": “having job skills 
that employers need" and “being able to support oneself financially". The third item 
asked the respondent’s position on a scale 0-10, where “0 means that immigrants 
 take jobs from native-born [NATIONALITY], 10 means that immigrants take the sorts 
of jobs that [NATIONALITY] don’t want and 5 is exactly in the middle". 
 
We inspected both indexes for unidimensionality through a principal component 
analysis on the overall sample, including both test and control groups. Both an 
ocular test of the scree plot, the Kaiser rule, and a set of parallel analyses show that 
all variables of the respective indexes lay on one single factor.7 We calculated the 
mean score of the relevant items and built an index of economic threat and an index 
of cultural threat. Both indexes take a value of 0 when all the economic or cultural 
elements are judged as not important and a value of 10 when they are all judged as 
extremely important. Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for the cultural 
threat index. Participants in the deliberative poll seem slightly more relaxed about 
immigrants threatening the national culture than respondents in the control group. 
While both groups have a more positive outlook in wave 4, the change is somewhat 
larger for the test group. 
 
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the economic threat index for the test group 
and the control group in wave 1 and wave 4. Comparisons between the test group 
and the control group once again show participants in the deliberative poll having a 
slightly more optimistic outlook and being less inclined to change their attitudes 
towards more negative perceptions of immigrants. Just as for the cultural threat 
index over-time changes are small. This is an important observation as it limits the 
amount of variation to be explained in the subsequent analyses. 
 
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
 
 
Independent and control variables 
 
The two explanatory variables of most interest for our research question are 
ideology and educational level. Ideology is measured through self-placement on a 
left-right scale running from 0 to 10. Recoded into three dichotomous variables, 
those that place themselves on the left (categories 0-3) and those that place 
themselves on the right (categories 7-10) are included in the analyses (with 
respondents placing themselves at the centre of the scale (4-6) as the reference 
category). Educational level is measured through a question enquiring at what age 
the respondent had completed full-time education. For ease of interpretation this 
variable has been reversed, so that high values denote lower levels of education. If 
less well educated respondents are more likely to change their attitudes, the 
coefficient for education should be positive and significant. 
 
Our expectation is that those placing themselves on the right end of the ideological 
spectrum will generally have less favorable attitudes towards immigrants. Among 
leftist respondents we assume those with lower levels of education to be 
considerably less optimistic about immigration than those with higher educational 
 levels, consequently mirroring ‘rightist’ attitudes on immigrants and immigration. 
Following hypothesis one, we expect all less well educated respondents who took 
part in the deliberative poll (i.e. test group participants) to be more likely to change 
their attitudes on immigration as this group faces the largest information gap and 
will, therefore, be most dependent on cues. Following hypothesis two, according to 
which participants connect informational input to their ideological predispositions, 
we expect less well educated left-wing voters to change opinions towards 
immigrants and immigration issues more frequently than other participants in the 
deliberative poll. More specifically, we assume these respondents to become 
significantly more positively disposed towards the immigration issue after 
deliberation, since their more ’rightist’ policy attitudes were most out of tune with 
their self-expressed ’leftist’ ideological beliefs. If deliberative polling indeed 
facilitates attitude change, respondents in the control group should show either no 
attitude change at all or at most very little. 
 
Apart from our two main independent variables of interest, the analyses presented 
below include a number of control variables that may affect attitudes towards 
immigrants as well as changes therein: gender (1=male), age, and religiosity (running 
from 1=never attends religious services (apart from weddings and funerals) to 8= 
attends religious services more than once a week). We also include a measure of 
whether the respondent was born in the country of residence (1=born in country), 
given that having an immigrant background may influence attitude strength and, 
therefore, also levels of change. All background variables are measured at t1. 
 
Political knowledge, lastly, is measured in a two-fold manner. The first index 
measures general knowledge of the European Union and counts the number of 
correct answers to two questions on a scale from 0 ‘both answers wrong’ to 1 ’both 
answers correct’. Following Luskin et al. (2002) we consider ‘don’t know’ an 
incorrect answer. The second index is also based on two questions, but relates to – 
admittedly very specific – knowledge about immigration issues. We include both 
levels of knowledge measured at t1 in the analyses presented below. 
 
Self-selection bias and coarsened exact matching 
 
As with all (quasi-)experimental research, the difficulty of our research design is that 
our respondents are part of either the test group or the control group but never of 
both. This leads to a degree of speculation as to what would have happened had 
participants of the test group not been included in the deliberative poll and vice 
versa (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). As may be recalled, the test group in our study 
consists of respondents to the questionnaire administered in wave 1 who agreed to 
participate in the deliberative poll. Self-selection bias likely plays a role, as it is not a 
far stretch to assume that those more interested in politics, those better educated, 
or those with more time on their hands are more favourably inclined to participate 
in a three-day polling event. 
 
The pre-treatment differences between the test group and the control group make 
it impossible to conclude that observed differences regarding changes in attitudes 
 on the immigration issues are truly the effect of participation in the deliberative 
poll. They could, after all, also be the result of the two groups having slightly 
different characteristics to start with. Matching minimizes the possibility that 
observed differences between the outcome of interest are caused by factors other 
than participation in the deliberative poll. 
 
We thus apply such a matching method to iron out differences between the test and 
the control group based on fixed characteristics. In essence, matching is a method 
that allows one to pre-process data by finding matching cases in terms of a number 
of confounding pre-treatment control covariates in the test group and the control 
group. Unmatched cases are not used for analysis. The ultimate aim of matching is 
to arrive at a better balance between the test group and the control group in as 
much as the distribution of covariates in the two groups is more in tune. Matching 
leads to results being less model dependent and reduces statistical bias (Deheija and 
Wahba, 1998, 1999; Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Rubin, 1987). By obtaining more 
balance, more meaningful comparisons can be made between the test group and 
the control group. 
 
Matching methods essentially differ in the way matched cases between the test 
group and the control group are defined. When data are completely balanced the 
said pre-treatment covariates do not have to be controlled for any longer, as the 
treatment effect can no longer depend on these variables. The downside of exact 
matching is that it often produces few matches, as it difficult to find identical cases 
in the test group and the control group when taking into account numerous 
variables with numerous values. Approximate matching methods specify a metric to 
match cases between the test group and the control group. 
 
In this paper we apply coarsened exact matching (cem) whereby variables are first 
categorized in substantially meaningful groups. In the next step, for each test group 
respondent a control group participant is found who matches exactly on the 
(coarsened) covariates (Blackwell et al., 2009; Iacus et al., 2011a,b). Cases that do 
not have an exact match are not considered. Finally, the coarsened values are 
abandoned and the original values of the matched data are used for the estimation 
of the causal effect. The coarsening of variables has the advantage that more cases 
remain available after matching. Moreover, cem is a monotonic imbalance-reducing 
matching method, which means that adjusting the imbalance of one variable does 
not affect the maximum imbalance of any other variable. Another specific 
characteristic of cem is that it balances on the whole distribution of the test and 
control groups rather than on the mean only. 
 
From a practical point of view coarsened exact matching starts with the calculation 
of the multivariate imbalance of the unmatched data. Subsequently, a matching 
algorithm is applied to attempt to improve balance. Once the best matching 
algorithm is established, matching essentially becomes a weighting scheme. Taking 
into account age, gender, education, attendance of religious services, and social 
class, the multivariate imbalance in our data set equals 0.719 on a scale from 0 (no 
multivariate imbalance) to 1 (complete separation). After applying the cem 
 algorithm based on age, gender, and education the multivariate imbalance drops to 
no less than 0.137 while we retain 98.9% of our cases to work with. While various 
combinations of pre-treatment variables were tried, none of these resulted in such a 
stark improvement of the balance and such a high number of remaining 
observations. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Before starting to assess our hypotheses we need, first of all, to understand whether 
the asymmetry that Sniderman et al. claim exists on immigration issues is also 
present in our test and control group. To do so, we broke down our two indexes by 
levels of education and self-reported ideology. Figure 2 shows four graphs that 
depict the average scores on the two indexes for the test group and the control 
group measured at wave 1 using the matched data set. Each of the four graphs 
shows two lines – one for respondents with lower educational levels and one for 
respondents with better educational levels – and traces average scores from left to 
right. 
 
<FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE > 
 
Figure 2. Two indexes of educational level and ideology for test and control groups – 
wave 1 
 
Note: lay out as follows 
 
2a. 2b. 
2c. 2d. 
 
 
Given that higher scores correspond to more hostile attitudes, the graphs confirm 
the overall more hostile predispositions of right-leaning citizens towards 
immigrants. The difference is in the order of 1 to 2 points on an 11-point scale. The 
graphs, moreover, confirm that for those placing themselves on the left, levels of 
education influence whether citizens are more or less hostile towards immigrants. 
The same is less true for right-leaning citizens, as is indicated by the higher degree of 
congruence between lower and better educated respondents placing themselves on 
the right of the political spectrum. The difference between lower and better 
educated respondents is up to 2.5 points on an 11-point scale. 
 
While left-leaning respondents are generally more positively predisposed towards 
immigrants than those placing themselves on the right, less well educated leftist 
respondents are much more likely to see immigration as a cultural and an economic 
threat compared to better educated left-leaning voters. As predicted by Sniderman 
et al. (2000), they do indeed seem to exhibit attitudes very similar to those placing 
themselves on the right. 
 
 In the next step, the role of education and ideology in attitude change is further 
assessed in a multivariate setting including other explanatory factors of change. For 
this purpose we ran a number of OLS regression analyses, which are presented in 
Table 3. All models are estimated on the matched data set. 
 
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE > 
 
Table 3 shows two models for each of the two indexes: one for the test group and 
one for the control group. The dependent variable in the respective models is the 
change between wave 4 and wave 1 on the economic threat index and the cultural 
threat index, where negative scores correspond to respondents becoming more 
negatively disposed towards immigrants and positive scores mean respondents 
became more positive with time. The control variables included in the models are 
described in the previous section. 
 
Two variables are of particular interest for the purpose of answering our research 
question: the interaction effects between lower educational levels and self-
placement on the left or self-placement on the right of the ideological spectrum. If 
significant, these variables indicate that there is an additive effect for respondents 
with these characteristics, meaning that less well educated left-leaning or less well 
educated right-leaning respondents change more than those placing themselves in 
the centre and also change more than those with better educational levels. If 
positive for test group respondents, the interaction effects indicate that less well 
educated left and right leaners are likely to become more positively disposed 
towards immigrants after having participated in the deliberative poll. These 
interaction terms should not reach statistical significance in the models of the 
control group, as these respondents did not partake in the deliberative event. 
 
If we were to find a positive and significant coefficient for less well educated left-
leaners only among the test group participants, this would confirm the hypothesis 
that deliberative polling helps to readjust the attitudes of those that Sniderman et 
al. found to be most out of tune with their ideological predispositions. If, however, 
the interaction term with educational level is significant for both left-leaners and 
right-leaners, we have to conclude that ideology does not play such a crucial role in 
deliberative attitude change. 
 
The models for the economic threat index confirm the latter hypothesis. Both the 
interaction term between lower educational levels and left self-placement and the 
interaction term between lower educational levels and right self-placement are 
statistically significant and positive for the test group. The interaction terms are not 
statistically significant in the model for the control group. This indicates that when it 
comes to the economic threats of immigration, deliberation makes less well 
educated citizens on the left and the right more inclined to change their attitudes. 
The models for the cultural threat index, by contrast, paint a different picture. 
Unlike the interaction term between education and right self-placement, the 
interaction effect between left self-placement and lower educational levels shows 
up positive and significant for the test group. This confirms our second hypothesis 
 that less well educated left-wing citizens are more likely to adjust their attitudes 
after participating in the deliberative poll. 
 
A second way to assess our hypotheses is to pool the data for the test group and the 
control group and include a dummy variable and interaction effects for participation 
in the deliberative poll. We are particularly interested in the coefficient for the 
three-way interaction effects between lower educational levels, self-placement on 
the left or right of the ideological spectrum, and being part of the test group. 
Positive and significant coefficients indicate that less well educated, left-wing/right-
wing respondents participating in the deliberative poll are more inclined to change 
their attitudes on the immigration issue. The results of the models with the three-
way interactions are presented in Table 4. 
 
<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE > 
 
The models in Table 4 seem to provide support for the idea that ideology plays a 
role in attitude change. The interaction between education, left self-placement and 
participation in the deliberative poll is statistically significant for both dependent 
variables. In terms of statistical significance the effect is weaker for the economic 
threat index than for the cultural threat index. The interaction between education, 
right self-placement and participation in the deliberative poll is not significant at the 
p<0.05 level. Both models, thus, provide support for hypothesis 2 according to 
which informational input is linked to ideological predispositions mediated through 
educational levels. 
 
Summarizing, three out of four models point towards a role for ideology in attitude 
change. Admittedly, all our models perform poorly as is indicated by the low r-
square. This implies that our models are underspecified and that factors other than 
education and ideology, factors that have not been accounted for, play a role in 
attitude change – whether attitude change is regarded as due to deliberation or not. 
 
 
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
 
This paper represents an attempt to examine the impact of deliberation and 
informed discussion in a quasi-experimental context, going beyond simple pre-and 
post-event comparisons of attitude change. Focusing on the micro-mechanisms of 
attitude change in a deliberative environment, the aim of our paper was to address 
the relative role of ideology and information in attitude change. Our results show 
that, indeed, deliberation has a differential impact on people depending on their 
ideological predispositions and their level of education. Those participants more 
likely to change are the ones whose preferences are not in line with their own 
ideological predispositions and because they are less astute about the connection 
between their values and policy preferences. Deliberative polls are an instrument 
that makes it possible for one’s true preferences to reveal themselves. This result 
indicates the importance of the interaction between information and political 
predispositions in explaining who, in a deliberative setting, will change their 
 attitudes and to what extent. 
 
While we focus on an issue where the mismatch asymmetry between ideological 
predispositions and attitudes materializes among left-wing voters, there is no 
reason to expect that the adaption of preferences based on ideology and 
educational levels is limited to left-wing voters. Our argument could be cast in a 
more general way. However, it is also true that few issues present the asymmetric 
nature that manifests itself with regard to immigrants and immigration, mostly due 
to the strong appeal that authority values exert on some groups in society.  
 
Our results are tentative in two ways. First, they are not as strong as one could 
expect. Part of the problem is that we assume that experimental manipulation will 
have a direct effect on the relationship between ideology and policy preferences, 
while, as Sniderman has shown in his work, this relationship is in fact mediated by 
authority values. Second, in this paper we have focused exclusively on less well 
educated respondents, and we have not explored in detail what happens among the 
better educated. In particular, we have not assessed whether, as has been 
suggested by Sniderman et al. (1991), deliberation makes those who are more 
politically aware and equipped with a wider set of considerations more alert to the 
complexity of the issues discussed. This – in turn – might reduce the consistency 
between their ideological leanings and policy preferences rather than further 
consolidating the link between the two. 
 
Moving to the more general implications of our results, we want to stress three of 
them here: two theoretical and one political. The first theoretical implication is that 
our results seem to suggest that ideological stances are more relevant when it 
comes to assessing the cultural consequences of immigration than when 
immigration evokes economic considerations. These results are in line with a stream 
of literature that suggests that identity considerations are far more important than 
economic ones in explaining (negative) attitudes toward immigrants (e.g. Burns and 
Gimpel, 2000; McLaren, 2003). Our paper offers a second theoretical contribution to 
the general debate about the structure of beliefs of the mass public. The heuristic 
route argues that public preferences are basically driven by the external context, as 
reflected in elite and media debates. A second view contends, on the contrary, that 
people hold a stable set of predispositions that interact with the external media 
environment in complex ways. Our results show people able, when they are set in 
the proper conditions, to change their minds so as to make their preferences more 
coherent with their predispositions. This seems to vindicate the view that 
predispositions and values have an autonomous role to play in orienting people’s 
attitudes. The problem is that quite often, especially among the least politically 
aware, the connection between values and policy preferences is not so clear. 
 
Last, our paper’s conclusions also have political relevance. Immigration issues have 
two peculiarities. First, as suggested by Freeman (1995, 884), “public opinion in 
liberal democracies is (...) more indifferent if not more favourable to immigration 
than it would be if more and better information were available". Second, it has been 
suggested that immigration worries are “a reliable weapon of last resort for 
 conservative parties competing with social democrats" (Thränhardt, 1995, 337). The 
combination of these two elements helps to explain why, typically, when parties of 
the left are confronted by the mobilizing strategy of right-wing parties, they react to 
the problem either by pandering to right-wing policy positions or by obfuscating 
their more liberal positions, afraid of losing the voters who seem closer to law and 
order values. However, our results, tentative as they are, show that this strategy is 
in fact counter-productive. Less aware left-wing voters seem to be receptive to 
information and arguments that clarify policy preferences as compared to their 
ideological positions. However, they need a more open discussion and clearer cues 
from their political elites to orient themselves. 
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 NOTES 
 
                                                     
1 Earlier versions of this paper have been presented at the 6th General Conference of the European 
Consortium for Political Research, Reykjavik, 25-27 August 2011 and at the Workshop ‘Change in 
political attitudes: Panels and experiments’, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, 7-8 June 2012. We 
thank Paul Sniderman, the panellists and four anonymous reviewers for their comments. Of course, 
we ourselves bear full responsibility for any mistakes and errors. 
2 While Sniderman et al. (2000) talk in terms of political sophistication, they operationalize this 
concept through educational levels. Since the measurement of political sophistication is a 
contentious issue, we have opted to refer simply to education and educational levels. In this paper, 
we treat education as distinct from standard measures of factual information, typically considered 
measures of political awareness (e.g. Zaller, 1992). Education is more than a measure of “chronic” 
information (Alvarez and Brehm, 2002, 35-38), and Sniderman, following Dewey, contends that 
education is an indicator of democratic citizenship in both a normative and an empirical sense (see 
also Sniderman et al., 1991, 9-11). 
3 For one of the few reviews explicitly addressing this issue, see Krupnikov et al. (2007) 
4 The Deliberative Poll is a highly structured deliberative design invented by James Fishkin that has by 
now been implemented in more than 50 places at the local, national, and European level. For more 
information on the substantive topics and designs of each Deliberative Poll, see 
http://cdd.stanford.edu/. 
5 The research project was funded by the EU 7th Framework Programme (grant agreement SSH7-CT-
2009-225314) and by a group of European donors, led by the Compagnia di San Paolo (Italy), 
together with the King Baudouin Foundation (Belgium), the Bosch Foundation (Germany), and the 
Open Society Institute (Switzerland). An international team of European universities conducted the 
project. 
6 The penultimate version of the briefing material was tested for comprehensibility and balance. For 
this purpose, the document was translated into three languages (Italian, German, French) and its 
content was tested in these three countries using small group discussion (on average 20 persons with 
different backgrounds were selected) in order to assess the clarity of the document and its balance. 
Following the recommendations arising from these tests as well as those of the scientific partners, 
the final version in English was translated into 21 languages by EOS-TNS Opinion national agencies. 
When asked whether the briefing material clearly favored some positions over others (with 0 
meaning “the briefing material clearly favored some positions over others", 10 meaning the material 
was “completely balanced", and 5 being exactly “in the middle") the average score was 6.57 and the 
median category was 7 for the participants of the poll. 
7  The first factor in both indexes explains 47% of the variance, with an eigenvalue on the first factor 
of 1.414 for the economic threat index and 1.878 for the cultural threat index. 
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Figure 1. A schematic representation of the research design of the deliberative poll 
 
Figure 2. Two indexes of educational level and ideology for test and control groups – 
wave 1 
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 Table 1. Cultural threat index – descriptive statistics before and after, test and 
control group 
 
 Control group Test group 
 Wave 1 Wave 4 Wave 1 Wave 4 
 (Range 0-10) (Range 0-10) (Range 0-10) (Range 0-10) 
Mean 5.83 5.74 5.52 5.25 
Median 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.25 
SD 2.07 2.07 2.09 2.03 
N 912 900 319 321 
 
 
Table 2. Economic threat Index – descriptive statistics before and after, test and 
control group 
 
 Control group Test group 
 Wave 1 Wave 4 Wave 1 Wave 4 
 (Range 0-10) (Range 0-10) (Range 0-10) (Range 0-10) 
Mean 6.32 6.57 6.10 6.25 
Median 6.33 6.67 6.33 6.33 
SD 1.87 1.68 2.10 1.86 
N 932 971 317 331 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 3. Change on the two indices (wave 4 – wave 1) by ideological self-placement 
and education – test and control group separated 
 
 Economic threat index Cultural threat index 
 test group control group test group control group 
 b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) b/(se) 
Age 0.019*** 0.005 0.001 0.001 
 (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) 
Gender 0.074 -0.140 0.217 -0.180 
 (0.275) (0.139) (0.155) (0.145) 
Education -0.065** -0.029 -0.028 0.031 
 (0.030) (0.032) (0.031) (0.022) 
Religiosity 0.080* -0.005 -0.013 -0.048 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.049) (0.029) 
Immigration knowledge -0.528 -0.628* 0.662* 0.221 
 (0.418) (0.336) (0.364) (0.374) 
General knowledge 0.749 0.071 -0.400 0.224 
 (0.468) (0.325) (0.433) (0.315) 
Left self-placement -4.163*** -1.130 -2.567*** 0.767 
 (1.045) (1.050) (0.852) (0.499) 
Right self-placement -2.624** -1.076 -2.027 1.164 
 (1.075) (1.028) (1.322) (0.821) 
Born in country? 0.096 -0.328 0.205 0.069 
 (0.397) (0.202) (0.413) (0.425) 
Left *low education 0.179*** 0.053 0.114*** -0.035 
 (0.051) (0.047) (0.039) (0.022) 
Right *low education 0.120** 0.062 0.094 -0.046 
 (0.048) (0.040) (0.060) (0.037) 
Constant -0.066 0.568 0.588 -0.550 
 (0.962) (0.639) (0.905) (0.641) 
N 261 807 257 737 
R2 0.097 0.019 0.045 0.010 
p-levels: *<.10, **<0.05, ***<0.01   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4. Change on the two indices (wave 4 – wave 1) by ideological self-placement 
and education – test and control group pooled 
 
 
 
Economic 
threat index 
Cultural 
threat index 
 b/(se) b/(se) 
Age 0.008** 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.005) 
Gender -0.086 -0.078 
 (0.125) (0.130) 
Education -0.140 0.253* 
 (0.179) (0.148) 
Religiosity 0.018 -0.039 
 (0.032) (0.028) 
Immigration knowledge -0.537** 0.350 
 (0.253) (0.278) 
General knowledge 0.273 0.023 
 (0.287) (0.252) 
Left self-placement -0.686 0.618 
 (0.698) (0.486) 
Right self-placement -0.748 1.080 
 (0.952) (0.657) 
Born in country?  -0.197 0.146 
 (0.175) (0.346) 
Test group 1.433* 1.518* 
 (0.828) (0.767) 
Left*test group -3.588** -3.309*** 
 (1.342) (1.058) 
Right*test group -1.683 -3.142* 
 (1.408) (1.753) 
Low education*test group -0.055 -0.057 
 (0.039) (0.035) 
Left *low education 0.033 -0.028 
 (0.031) (0.023) 
Right *low education 0.046 -0.042 
 (0.038) (0.031) 
Left*low education*test 
group 0.149** 0.146*** 
 (0.065) (0.050) 
Right*low education*test 
group 0.068 0.141* 
 (0.061) (0.080) 
Constant -0.460 -0.130 
 (0.297) (0.428) 
N 1068 994 
R2 0.029 0.016 
p-levels: *<.10, **<0.05, ***<0.01   
 
 
 
  
APPENDIX A: CONSTRUCTION OF INDICES  
 
1. Cultural threat index 
 
Q10 - On a 0-10 scale, where ‘0’ is “extremely unimportant", ‘10’ is "extremely 
important", and ‘5’ is “exactly in the middle", how important or not would you say 
each of the following criteria should be in deciding which immigrants from non-EU 
countries should be admitted to [COUNTRY]? 
 
Q10.3 – Being able to speak [NATIONAL LANGUAGE].  
Q10.7 – Commitment to the [NATIONALITY] way of life.  
Q10.8 – Coming from a similar culture. 
 
Q15 - On a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 means that Muslim immigrants have much to 
offer to [COUNTRY]’s cultural life, 10 means that Muslim immigrants threaten 
[NATIONALITY] culture, and 5 is exactly in the middle, where would you position 
yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about that? 
 
2. Economic threat index 
 
Q10 - On a 0-10 scale, where ‘0’ is “extremely unimportant", ‘10’ is “extremely 
important", and ‘5’ is “exactly in the middle", how important or not would you say 
each of the following criteria should be in deciding which immigrants from non-EU 
countries should be admitted to [COUNTRY]? 
Q10.1 – Having job skills that employers need.  
Q10.6 – Being able to support themselves financially. 
 
Q16 – On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means that immigrants take jobs from 
native-born [NATIONALITY], 10 means that immigrants take the sorts of jobs that 
[NATIONALITY] don’t want and 5 is exactly in the middle, where would you position 
yourself on this scale, or haven’t you thought much about that? 
 
3. General knowledge 
Q43 – Is the main decision-making body of the European Union the...?8 
1. European Commission 
2. Council of Ministers * 
3. European Parliament 
4. European Court of Auditors 
 
Q44 – Only one of the following statements about the European Parliament is false. 
Which one is it?  
1. It passes all EU laws* 
2. It can dismiss the European Commission 
3. It can reject the budget proposed by the Council of Ministers 
4. It is involved in decisions about the admission of new Member States 
 
 4. Immigration knowledge 
 
Q46 – Which of the following is true of Blue Card workers? 
1. They can work anywhere in the EU 
2. They must have a university education* 
3. They cannot bring family members to join them any faster than other immigrants 
4. They are subject to the Returns Directive 
 
Q47 – Which of the following is true about the ways in which immigration policy is 
currently made?  
1. The EU sets the basic rules about entry and residency requirements* 
2. The EU decides how many immigrants can be admitted to each country 
3. Work permits for immigrants must be approved by the EU 
4. The EU plays no role in immigration policy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
8 Correct answers are denoted by an asterisk. 
 APPENDIX B: RELATIVE FREQUENCIES TEST AND CONTROL GROUP FOR BOTH INDICES - WAVE 1 
 
Table 5. Cultural threat index – Comparison test and control group (in %) at wave 1  
 
 Being able to speak the 
language 
Commitment to the 
national way of life 
Coming from a similar 
culture 
Muslim immigrants have 
much to offer 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control Test Control 
Extremely 
unimportant 8 7 8 7 34 25 12 7 
1 2 1 2 1 1 3 1 2 
2 3 2 3 2 7 6 5 4 
3 4 3 5 2 6 6 9 6 
4 1 3 2 3 6 5 8 5 
5 15 15 11 16 20 21 31 34 
6 6 5 4 5 6 6 7 6 
7 12 9 12 11 5 7 8 5 
8 13 13 20 13 8 8 7 7 
9 8 8 5 7 1 2 1 4 
Extremely important 29 33 29 32 6 9 9 12 
DK/RA 1 1 0 1 0 1 3 7 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) 333 1005 333 1005 333 1005 333 1005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6. Economic threat index – Comparison test and control group (in %) at wave 1  
 
 Have job skills employers 
need 
Being able to support 
themselves 
Immigrants take jobs 
nationals do not want 
 Test Control Test Control Test Control  
Extremely 
unimportant 
9 6 7 5 6 5 
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 
2 3 2 2 2 2 3 
3 3 3 2 2 4 3 
4 1 2 3 2 2 2 
5 14 19 12 13 23 24 
6 8 8 7 4 5 6 
7 15 11 11 9 9 10 
8 15 17 17 15 14 15 
9 4 5 6 8 5 4 
Extremely 
important  
29 26 32 38 25 22 
DK 1 2 1 1 3 4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(N) 333 1005 333 1005 333 1005 
 
 
 
